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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
17663

-vsROY HUTCHISON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with forcible sodomy, a second
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
amended,

§

76-5-403 (1953), as

for an act involving the genitals of SCOTT HARRIS

and the mouth of appellant, without the consent of SCOTT HARRIS.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried on January 19, 1981, in the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, before the
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, sitting without a jury.
Appellant was convicted of the above charge and sentenced to
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction in the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
About 2:10 on the morning of October 18, 1980, Scott
Harris, age sixteen, arrived at the Provo, Utah, Trailways
bus station, en route from visiting his parents in Price, Utah,
to a boys' ranch near Provo where he was living.

He planned

to wait at the station for transportation from Provo to the
ranch (Tr. 16-17).
station.

Appellant, Roy Hutchison, was also at the

Two Provo policemen, on a routine burglary check,

saw both appellant and Scott Harris there early that morning
(Tr. 8-9).
After the policemen left, appellant and Harris
engaged in trivial conversation, and appellant, learning that
Harris had no place to spend the night, invited Harris to his
apartment a short distance away (Tr, 19, 73).
At the apartment, appellant continued the drinking
he had begun earlier and gave Harris four or five drinks of

Whiskey and Pepsi (Tr, 71-72, 19-20).

When Harris began to

~eel ~he effects of the alcohol, he told appellant he needed

to lie down, and appellant directed him to the bedroom (Tr.
20, 35).

Just before he went into the bedroom, Harris saw

that appellant had put on a woman's dress and wiq (Tr.
-2-
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Harris fell unconscious on the bed but was awakened
a short time later bv aopellant's tugging at his belt.
Appellant was still wearing women's clothes. (Tr. 20-21).
Though he tried unsuccessfully to get up, and to push appellant
off, Harris was too weak to do either and again passed out on
the bed (Tr. 22).
The next thing Harris remembers is waking up with
appellant's mouth on his penis (Tr. 22).
been pulled down to his knees (Tr. 31-32).

Harris's pants had
He tried to resist

by kicking, squirming, and hitting (Tr. 22, 34) , but he
testified that "it felt as though my arms were made of lead"
(Tr. 22).

When he finally managed to get away, he ran out

the door and onto the lawn (Tr. 23).
At about 5:00 that morning, Jeff Suffern, who lived
in the area, drove past appellant's apartment to go deer
hunting.

He saw Harris lying naked "in smoke and fire" in

front of appellant's apartment (Tr. 12-13, 40, 71).

When

Suffern came to help, he found the boy "cold, burnt, and
presumably in shock"

(Tr. 13) near a pile of burning clothes.

Harris was wearing only a boot, which had been burned (Tr.
14).

Suffern removed the boot, covered HarriS·'With his coat,

and called the police.
Robert Smith, a Provo policeman who answered Suffern's
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call, also found Harris apparently in shock.

Though Smith

spoke with Harris at the scene and also later at the hospital,
Harris "wasn't able to respond too well"

(Tr. 41) , and also

appeared to be still under the influence of alcohol (Tr. 42).
Officer Smith's report, which appellant attempted to submit
as evidence at the trial, was made from Smith's notes of these
two conversations with Harris at the scene and at the hospital
(Tr. 46-47).

Though the police report apparently indicated

that Harris responded affirmatively when asked if appellant
had attempted anal intercourse with him (App. Brief, p. 3),
even at trial Harris did not have a clear understanding of
terms anal intercourse and fellatio,

t~

and had probably never

heard either term before this incident (Tr.

30-31).

Appellant

attempted to introduce the police report to impeach Harris's
credibility, but the trial court excluded it as a violation
of the hearsay evidence rule.

The trial court found that

appellant had the requisite intent to commit the crime and
found Scott Harris "quite a credible witness under heated ~d
extensive cross-examination"

(Tr. 77).

Appellant was convicted

as charged.

-4-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE
POLICE REPORT BECAUSE OF ITS UNRELIABILITY.
A.
THE POLICE REPORT IS UNRELIABLE BECAUSE
IT IS HEARSAY, AND THEREFORE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE.
In an attempt to impeach the credibility of Scott
Harris, the prosecuting witness, appellant endeavored at trial
to introduce as evidence a report prepared by Provo police
Officer Robert H. Smith.

The report was compiled from notes

Officer Smith took of two conversations with Harris, one
conversation at the scene of the incident, on appellant's
front lawn, and the other at the hospital where the witness
was taken for treatment (Tr. 46-47).

Since the police report

an after-the-fact account of conversations between Smith

~as

and Harris, it qualifies as hearsay ("a statement which is made
other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing").
Uta~

Rules of Evidence 63.
Hearsay has historically been categorized as inadmis-

sible because it is unreliable.
§§
§

See 5 Wigmore, Evidence,

1362-34 (Chadbourn rev. 1974); 29 Am.Jur. 22, Evidence,
493.

Although appellant in his brief asserts that the report

was prepared October 18, 1980, the day of the assault (Brief
of Appellant, at 3), the transcript only indicates that the

-5-
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conversations took place on that date, not that the report
was prepared then (Tr. 46).

It is logical to assume that

any lapse in time between the conversation and the reporting
of it would affect the reliability of the report.
Appellant suggests that police reports generally
are admissible as substantive evidence, to prove the truth
of the matter asserted

(Brief of appellant, at 3-4).

However, just because a document is a police report does
not make it immune from hearsay and other reliability
requirements.

Appellant himself concedes that the report

still must meet the primary prerequisite of trustworthiness.
See State v. McGeary, 322 A.2d 830

(N.J. 1974).

The general

rule for gauging a document's trustworthiness has been
articulated as follows:
[A]n official document, to be
admissible, must state facts within
the personal knowledge and observation
of the recording official or his subordinates . . . Onlv those official documents
are admissible which are based solelv on
the personal knowledge of the official who
prepared them.
State ex rel. Blankenship v. Freeman, 440 P. 2d 744
(emphasis added).

(Oi;.la. 1%8:

The matter asserted in the police report

here, that Hutchison committed anal intercourse, not fellatio,
on Harris, is not something "within the personal knowledge and
observation of the recording official."

Officer Smith arrived

some hours after the act occurred; his report of the actual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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j

incident could not be based on his own observation.
Moreover, admission of the report to prove "the truth
of the matter asserted" would not have aidi::;d appellant's
case.

Its admission would have been proof of anal

intercouse, which is merely a different type of forcible
sodomy.

The report therefore lacks the necessary reliability

to be admissible as substantive evidence of the supposed act
of anal intercourse.
B

THE POLICE REPORT WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE
UNDER ANY OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
HEARSAY RULE.
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, prohibits "evidence
of a statement which is made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing" for the purposes of proving "the
truth of the matter stated" unless the proof fits one of
several enumerated categories.

Appellant then names three of

those categories which supposedly exempt the police report
from exclusion as hearsay.
Rule 63 (1) (a) allows testimony of a witness's
prior statements which are inconsistent with the testimony
of that witness at the hearing.

Prior inconsistent statements

are admissible both as proof of the matter stated and for
impeachment purposes.
of Evidence.

Note, following Rule 63(1), Utah Rules

Appellant's position is that in the police

report Harris described Hutchison's act as anal intercourse,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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while at trial Harris referred to it as fellatio.

However,

the prior statement does not meet the foundation requirement
of reliability.

The record clearly shows that the sixteen

year old Harris was not, even by trial time, familiar with
the "legal" or "scientific" terms for the various types of
sodomy.

Furthermore, the boy seemed somewhat reluctant

to immediately reveal his ignorance:
Q.
[Defense counsel, Mr. Weight] : When
you were aroused or woke up again you
testified that you believe the defendant
was cor.unitting the act of fellatio?
h.
[Scott Harris]:
Yes.
Q.
Do you know what fellatio means?

A.

(Tr.31).

No.

That same reluctance to press for a definition of ar.

unfamiliar term could easily have been present when the
police officer questioned him as well.
The trial court responded to the boy's confusion
by suggesting that defendant counsel "use nonlegal language
for the witness."

He then cautioned Harris:

"Be sure you

understand the questions, young man, before you answer them.
If you don't understand them, tell me"

(Tr. 31).

It was, no

doubt, obvious to the trial court that the boy' s confusion of
the terms was not evidence that anal intercourse occurred
nor grounds for impeaching his credibility as a witness, but
was simply a teenager's unfamiliarity with specific
vocabulary.

When asked to describe in detail the act itself,

Harris was not at all confused, nor does appellant claim
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

_.l

any inconsistency in that testimony.

It is only in

Harris's use of the labels that appellant finds any
variation.
Appellant also contends that Rule 63(13),
Utah Rules of Evidence, excepts the police report from
exclusion as hearsay.

The rule provides for exception

of:
(13)
Business Entries and The
Like.
Writings offered as memoranda or
records of acts, conditions or events to
prove the facts stated therein, if the
judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of a business at or about
the time of the act, condition or event
recorded, and that the sources of information from which made and the method and
circumstances of their preparation were
such as to indicate trustworthiness.
(Emp'.-lasis added.)

The investigating police officer and the

'v:itness \.'ho discovered Harris naked on the lawn described
nim as being "presumably in shock"
2nu

unce~

(Tr.13), "cold"

the influence of alcohol (Tr.42).

(Tr. 41)

He was lying

"in smoKe anc fire," burned (Tr.12), beside his smoking
~elcn~incs,

~ith

nothing on but a burned boot (Tr.14).

It

'>:as in ti1ese circumstances that Harris had his first
conversation with Officer Smith.

The second took place

at the hospital a short time later.

These were the

"sources of information" and the "circumstances" from which
the report was made.

They cannot be expected to be as lucid

or as consistent as the "trustworthiness" standard implies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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they mus-c be.

Indeed, the setting of the extrajudicial

statement is generally a key indicator of the statement's
probable trustworthiness.
1034, 1037 (Ore. 1974).

State v. Derryberry,

528 P.2d

For example, an out-of-court

statement by a person who had taken drugs earlier in the
day has been ruled inadmissible because of the drug's
effect on the witness's memory and perception.
Howard, 12 Wash.App. 158, 529 P. 2d 21, 22

(1974).

See State v.
Undoubtedly,

the trial court took into account the circumstances and the
dazed state of the v.·itness when it ruled against the report's
admission.
Appellant also relies on Rule 63 (15), Utah Rules
of Evidence, to justify admission of the report for impeachment
purposes.

That hearsay exception, entitled "Reports and

Findings of Public Officials," provides for admission of:
.factual data contained in written
reports or findings of fact made by a public
official of the United States or of a state
or territcrv of the United States, if the
judge finds.that the making thereof was
within the scope of the duty of such
official a~d that it was his duty (a) to
perforr, the act reported, or (b) to observe
the act, condition, or event reported, or (c)
to investigate the facts concerning the act,
condition or event and to make findings or
draw conclusions based on such investigation.
(Emphasis added).

Harris's alleged statement in the police

report does not qualify under this description.

First, Harris"

reply to the Officer's questioning cannot be classed as

11

factua:I
I
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I

date" or "findings of fact."

The officer did not find as a

matter of fact that Hutchison committed anal intercourse
on Harris.

The reply certainly cannot be classified as

empirical or tangible evidence or data.

It does not fit

the category of evidence intended by the exception.

The

section further contemplates the reporting of an "act,
condition or event," performed, observed, or investigated
by the officer (subsections a, b, and c).

However, the

evidence at issue here is a statement, not an act, condition,
or event, nor is it a finding about the event.

Again, it

is not the tangible, reliable kind of evidence that would
meet the requirements of the exemption.

If the officer's

report is to be sufficiently credible to stand as proof of
the matter asserted, this section requires a close involvement
by the officer with the event itself.

Reporting of a statement

about the event is a step removed from the evidence allowed
by Rule 63 (15).

The value of the police report for impeachment was
~er

:imited.

Appellant could have accomplished the same

result by asking the victim and the officer about the victim's
confusion of terms.

Sufficient foundation to allow cross-

examination about the inconsistency was possible without the
report.

Appellant's counsel failed to lay adequate foundation,

but such failure does not render rejection of the report as
error.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant has not objected to the exclusion of the
police report on the grounds that it qualifies under the
spontaneous or contemporaneous utterances exception to the
hearsay rule (See Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evidence).
Therefore, that argument is technically not an issue on
appeal.

However, because the hearsay issue is generally

before this court, and because the point is one that might
naturally be raised under these facts,

respondent will deal

with it here.
Rule 63 (4), Utah Rules of Evidence, allows admissior.
of a statement

(a) which the judge finds was made while the

declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the
statement narrates, describes or explains; or (b) which the
judge finds was made while the declarant was under the stress
of a nervous excitement caused by such perception.

The

rationale behind the exception is that instinctive or
spontaneous statements that rise out of events reflect the
true nature of the situation and the speaker's feelings,
and thus are presl.L'71ptively truthful.
Evidence, § 708.

See 29 Arn. Jur. 2d,

The exception does not apply in this case,

however, since the requisite spontaneity is lacking.

The

situation is parallel in crucial respect to McGugan v. State,
167 P. 2d 76

(Okla. 1946), where the court ruled inadmissible

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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statements made to police officers by the victim of a rape.
The statements were not part of the res gestae, said the
court, because the prosecutrix had not volunteered them to
the first person she had contact with after the crime, and
because some time had elapsed before she could get to the
police station.

Similarly, the prosecuting witness's con-

tested statement here was not volunteered to Suffern, who
first discovered him, nor to Officer Smith, but was a response
to questioning which occurred sometime after Harris was
discovered and regained consciousness.
Respondent maintains that the prosecuting witness's
statements to the police were not, by their nature, of the
type that generally qualify under the exception.

They were

not instinctual reactions to the criminal act itself,

since

that had occurred some hours before, nor were they uttered in
2

On the contrary, Harris was

startlec or excited state.

dazed anc subdued.

Further, the nature of the disputed terms

(anal intercourse or fellatio) makes it highly unlikely that
~ney

would be part of the instinctive vocabulary of a

sixteen year old (see also State v. Wilson, 532 P.2d 825
(Ore. 1975)).

c
THE POLICE REPORT WAS INADMISSIBLE
BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO LAY
APPROPRIATE FOUNDATION FOR ITS
ACCEPTANCE.
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The police report was inadmissible as substantive
evidence to impeach Harris under any of the hearsay
exceptions because it lacks inherent reliability; its
reliability is further questionable because a proper
It is a well-

foundation was not laid for its admission.

established rule of evidence that before a report can be
received in evidence certain authenticity requirements
must be met.

See State v. Orona,

92 N.M.

(1979); Dolan v. People, 449 P.2d 828
v. State, 253 A. 2d 206
201 Kan.

(Del.

655, 443 P.2d 673

(1972) 14-19.

450,

(Colo.

589 P. 2d 1041

1969); Johnson

Supr. 1969); Mathis v.

Stricklinc,

(1968); McCormick, Law of Evidence

These requirements include, in addition to

establishing the time and place of the recording, verification
by the maker that the report is an accurate reflection of hls
memory of the event.

This verification is usually accornplisnei

by exhausting the Kitness's memory on the subject--asking
him to testify first to his independent recollection of the
incident.

See State v. Orona, supra, at 1045; 3 Weinstein's

Evidence, § 612[01]

(1978).

Appellant's counsel here failed

to meet the authentication requirements because he did not ask
Officer Smith either to testify as to his recollections of the
interviews with Harris or to refresh his recollection by lookin:
at the report.

Officer Smith identified the document as

being a copy of the incident report prepared from notes of the

-14-
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conversations between himself and Harris, but appellant's
counsel went no further than those preliminary identification
questions before requesting that the
evidence (Tr. 46-48).

repor~

be submitted in

What specifically transpired during the

interviews was not even alluded to; Officer Smith was never
asked if he could remember the content of the interviews nor
given an opportunity to testify independently of the
statements in the report.

Appellant's counsel came to the

point in his questioning where those questions would have been
appropriate, but failed to ask them.
Failure to lay proper foundation was not cited by the
trial court as a reason for excluding the report.

However,

even if, arguendo, the report was excluded for the wrong
reason, the existence of other valid reasons for its exclusion
means that the evidence was properly barred.

See Shore Line

Properties, Inc. v. Deer-0-P&ints and Chemicals, Ltd., 24
.:.riz.J.pp.

331, 538 P. 2d 760

(1975); Foss Lewis

&

Sons Const.

Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 30 Utah 2d 290, 517
P.2d 539

(1973); Green Ditch

15 Utah 2d 224, 370 P.2d 586

~ater

Co. v. Salt Lake City,

(1964).

POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EXERCISED HIS
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING THE POLICE REPORT.
The trial judge found that the police report was
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not admissible for impeachment purposes (Tr.49)--to prove
that a contradictory statement had been made.

The court

noted Harris's uncertainty about nomenclature under
examination (Tr.31) and specifically found him a credible
witness, even under heated cross-examination (Tr.77).
Whatever inconsistency there may have been was not of
significant relevance or reliability, in the court's judgment,
to impair the credibility of the prosecuting witness or
require the admission of questionable evidence.
This court has consistently held that "the trial
judge has superior knowledge as to the competency and effect
which should be given evidence."
Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811

(1972).

Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27
In addition, when the

trial is to a judge, as here, and not to a jury, decisions
about the admissibility of evidence are less stringently
examined, since the judge is making his decisions on both
the law and the facts.

This court has said:

.when the trial is to the court,
his rulings on evidence need not be subjected
to quite such critical scrutiny as when it is
to a jury, because in arriving at his conclusions
upon the issues he will include in his
consideration of them his knowledge and his
judgment as to the competency, materiality
and effect of evidence.
In re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 442, 445
(1965).

See also Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18
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j

Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132

(1966).

The presumption is that

rhe trial judge will be able to distill what is relevant
from the evidence presented and offered.
Therefore, unless there is a clear showing that
the trial judge has abused this discretion, his decisions
should not be overturned.

"This court has held that it will

not disturb any decision within the discretion of the trial
court, unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of that
discretion."

State v. Carlson, Nos. 16582, 16583

July 31, 1981).

(Utah,

Since the trial judge has great leeway in

deciding what the facts are, as presented by the evidence,
there is no clear showing that he abused his discretion in
choosing to believe and give weight to certain facts while
excluding others.

See Salt Lake City v. United Park City

;:ine Cc., 28 Utah 2d 409, 503 P. 2d 850

(1972).

In order to reverse a verdict based on the
erroneous exclusio!"'. of evidence, two things must be shown,
2s

descri~ed

in Ru:e 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:

~ ver~ict or findinc shall not be
set aside, nor shall the,judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a)
it appears of record that the proponent of
the evidence either made known the substance
of the evidence in a form and by a method
approved by the judge, or indicated the
substance of the expected evidence by questions
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indicating the desired answers, and (b)
the court which passes upon the effect of
the error or errors is of the opinion that
the excluded evidence would probably have had
a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict or finding.
'
Appellant has failed to satisfy these prerequisites.

The

evidence was not introduced in a form approved by the judge;
instead, it was classified as hearsay.

Nor did appellant

indicate the substance of the expected evidence by his
questions; in fact, he neglected to ask the questions
necessary for a proper foundation for the evidence.

Since

there is no clear showing that there would have been a
different result if the report had been admitted, as

discuss~

below, the trial court's discretion should not be overturned.
POINT III
IF EXCLUSION OF THE REPORT WAS ERROR, IT
WAS HARMLESS ERROR.
Should this Court find that the trial court's refusal
to admit the police report was error, such refusal did not
prejudice the substantive rights of the appellant and thus
does not justify reversal of the conviction.

This Court has

pointed out on numerous occasions that it "will not reverse
criminal cases for mere error or irregularity."
Neal, l Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 756
§

(1953).

State v.

Utah Code Ann.

77-42-1 (1953), states in part:
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I

_1

If error has been committed, it
shall not be presumed to have resulted in
prejudice.
The court must be satisfied
that it has that effect before it is
warranted in reversing the judgment.
Improper reception or rejection of evidence is not grounds
for reversal if there is sufficient competent evidence
to sustain the judgment.

See Bonine v. Bonine, 367 P.2d

6 6 4 (Ariz . 1961 ) .
In this case, appellant has failed to show that
the result would have been different if the evidence
has been admitted.

The prosecuting witness's testimony is

not denied or contradicted by appellant.

Although appellant

admitted inviting Harris home with him, he testified that he
coes not remember \·;hat happened that night (Tr.73,75).

The

;:rosecutins witness's testimony, on the other hand, is
corroborated by several verified facts:
EJ~chiscn

in a dress

a dress and wig

fo~nd

an~

Harris saw

wig; in court Harris identified

in Hutchison's apartment as looking

li;,e tic.cse !"le Sa\; Eutchison wearing; Harris testified that
a;::::e::._la:-_e: pulled Bc.rris's pants down and he ran out of the
house in the middle of the night; Harris was found naked on
appellant's lawn at five o'clock a.m.
Harris's testimony that the sodomy occurred was
uncontradicted and even verified by circumstantial evidence.
But even if there was proof that the event occurred as
;:urportedly recorded in the police report, the act would still
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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constitute sodomy.

Under the Utah statute, either unconsented

anal or oral intercourse is forcible sodomy,:
(1)
A person commits sodomy when he
engages in any sexual act involving the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
of another person, regardless of the sex of
either participant.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-403

(1953)

(emphasis added).

Therefore, even if the matter asserted could be proven, its
exclusion would be harmless error because the act would still
constitute a necessary element of the crime.
In State v. Simmons, upon finding that excluded
hearsay evidence was admissible, the court gave a test for
determining whether the exclusion was harmless:
We must review alleged error in
conformity with 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, and
may not interfere with a jury verdict,
unless upon review of the entire record,
there emerges error of sufficient gravity
to indicate defendant's rights were
prejudiced, in a substantial manner.
There must be a reasonable probability there
would have been a result more favorable to
defendant, in the absence of error.
573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977).

The alleged error in this case

is not of sufficient gravity to indicate that appellant's
rights were prejudiced.
The exclusion, if error, would also be harmless
error because appellant had other ways of attacking Harris's
credibility.

The trial court's ruling only excluded the

police report; it did not prevent appellant from questioning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the witness's consistency and credibility in other ways.
Appellant might have questioned Harris's knowledge of
other anatomical terns or homosexual practices, to
establish that Harris really did have more acquaintance
with the subject than he seemed to have.
did not.

But appellant

The burden was on him, not on the court or the

state, to pursue all avenues which might discredit the
witness.

Since the police report was not appellant's only

recourse, its exclusion was not of itself prejudicial and
any error in excluding it is harmless.

Appellant had ample

opportunity to challenge appellant's prior statement and
cor,fusion.

This was possible without the report and its

exclusion was therefore harmless.
The conclusion this Court reached in State v. Urias,
is

full~

apposite here:
:nc.ndate of our statute [U.C.A. §
(1953)], and the policy firmly
estab:ished in our decisional law, is that
we do not ~pset the verdict of a jury merely
because so~e error or irregularity may have
occurred, bit will do so only if it is
sone~ti~g s~bstantial and prejudicial in the
sense t~at there is a reasonable likelihood
t~at in its absence there would have been
a different result.
~he

/-~2-::_

609 P. 2d 1326, 1329

(Utah 1980)

(emphasis added).

Respondent

submits that even if the police report had been admitted, the
discrepancy was so easily explainable and insignificant that
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the trial judge would not have ruled differently.

If

there was error committed, it had no prejudicial effect
upon appellant's rights.

In short, the judge could easily

have determined, with or without the police report, that
the prosecuting witness's testimony was consistent and
believable.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT.
A

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
PROSECUTING WITNESS'S UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT.
Appellant's challenge of the sufficiency of the
evidence is not unusual in a sexual assault case, because
so much of the proof rests upon the testimony of the victim.
In response to a similar challenge in State v. Ward, 10
Vt~~

2d

3~.

3~7

P.2d 865

(1959), this Court said:

In regard to t~E ~eneral C!~~rgc that t:1~
does n::.:~ supJ_Jort t!i~ verd.ict, t:ne
CeZenC.an~ c.rgues
thot the con\'iction should
·~\-iOence

be scrutinized with great care because it is
a charge easy to make and bard to defend
against; particularly so here because important parts of the state's case rest entirely
upon the testimony of the prose cu tr ix.
With
that general proposition we are in accord.
But it also should be kept in mind that this
offense is rarely committed in the presence
of witnesses and often the conviction of the
guilty could only be had upon the victim's
testimony.
It has often been held that if
there is nothing inherently contradictory or
1ncred1ble in her story a conviction may rest
upon the v1ct1m's testimony alone.
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Id. at 868 (emphasis added).

--Appellant stresses that testimony by Harris
"was the only evidence at all presented by the State to
prove the elements of the crime alleged."
Brief at 18-19.

Yet, this court has specifically found

that fact unpersuasive.
P.2d 908

Appellant's

In State v. Middelstadt, 579

(Utah 1978), the court gave the basis on which

it must deal with uncorroborated testimony:
In general,
the common law supports the
contention that a conviction may be sustained
upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the
victim, and that such evidence is not insubstantial simply because the testimony is
conflicting in some respects.
As to the
quality of the testimony given, it is settled
that it must be so improbable that it is
completely unbelievable before it is insuffic1ent to u~hold a conviction.
We do not find
case here.
Consistent witt the Ward and
there
i:.::~:-·2n~l_:-

con:.~c.-~

:..ctcry

or

is

:..~=-~e~:.

te~~

this

incredii.:ile

testimony

is

in

t~

II

SQ

11

in

case

"nothing

the

victim's

i:;iprobaole

s~ppo~t

~arris's

that

it

accou~t.

Nor does the issue of consent apply here to
invalidate Harris's testimony.
Utah Code Ann§ 76-5-406

The pertinent part of

(1977), contains this definition

of lack of consent:
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is

An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy,
or sexual abuse is without consent of the
victim under any of the following circumstances:
(3)
The victim has not consented and the
actor knows the victim is unconscious, unaware
that the act is occurring, or physically
unable to resist;
{Emphasis added.)

Harris's testimony that he was both

unconscious and, later, physically unable to resist are
corroborated by his conduct after the assault:

he freed

himself as soon as he could and fled the house.

In his

intoxicated condition he could not go far, but his
immediate impulse was to leave.

Harris was found a few

hours later outside, not inside, the house, his condition
verification of a hasty exit.
117, 63 P.2d 585, 588

In State v.

Roberts, 91 Utah

(1937), this Court concluded that the

trial court "could properly consider the conduct of the
[victim] towards the defendant after the commission of the
assault as bearing on whether [he] consented."

Hutchison

d~!

not deny that an act of sodomy took place; Harris' s condi tioc
the next morning is certainly strong evidence that the act'"'!
not consensual.
B

ON APPEAL, EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED IN
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO CONVICTION.

~HE

At trial, the finder of fact found appellant guilty
of forcible sodomy.

On appeal, the evidence should be viewed

in the light most favorable to that verdict.
10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865

State v. W~'

(1959); State v. Berchtold,
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I

..L
I

:._1

l~tab

2d 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960).

The finder of fact

was in the best position to observe the facial expressions,
~annerisms,

and tone of voice of the witnesses, and thus

was in the best position to weigh the evidence.

Those

kinds of judgments are difficult, if not impossible, to
make on appeal.
Further, this court has determined that on
appeal from conviction, the court must assume that the
trial court believed those aspects of evidence and drew
inferences that reasonably could be drawn therefrom in a
lisht favorable to the verdict.
7SO

State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d

(Utah 1977); State v. Gandee, 587 P. 2d 1064

(Utah 1978).

In other words, the strong presumption is that the trial
verdict is correct.
provi~g

Appellant, to prevail, has the burden of

that the verdict was unreasonable, and this he has

:aileC t.c Co.

Appellant, citing as error the trial court's
refusal to admit the police report as evidence, attempts
to

the prosecutinq witness's credibility.

c~der~ine

Yet it

is a well-settled axiom of criminal law in this state that
the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of
witnesses.

State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216
530 P.2d 1272
307 P.2d 212

(Utah 1977);

(Utah 1976); State v. Mills,

(Utah 1975); State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110,
(1957).

In a restatement of the standard of
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review it would apply to claims of insufficiency such
as appellant's, this court declared:
It is the exclusive functioti of the
jury [fact-finder] to weigh the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, and it is not within the
prerogative of this court to substitute
its judgment for that of the fact-finder.
This court should only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that reasonable men could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.
State v. Lamm, 606 P. 2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)

(emphasis

added).
Thus, appellant's burden here is to show that the
evidence was so clearly inconclusive or unsatisfactory that
reasonable minds must have had reasonable doubts that the
crime was committed.

Appellant has not met that burden.

This court even more emphatically set the standard

appella~

must meet in State v. Romero, supra:
This court has set the standard for
determining sufficiency of evidence to
require that it be so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable that reasonable
minds could not reasonably believe defendant
had committed a crime.
Unless there is a
clear showing of lack of evidence, the [trial
court] verdict will be ppheld.
554 P.2d at 219 (emphasis added).
Respondent submits that in viewing the evidence in
its entirety, as the trial court did, it is not "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds"
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-could not convict a?pellant.

On the contrary, the evidence

was sufficient and substantial and, therefore, the verdict
should be upheld.

Appellant has not made "a clear showing

of lack o:: evidence," as this court requires.

The only "lack

of evidence" appellant points to is his question of Harris's
credibility.

However, appellant's objection is without

foundation on appeal,

since judging the credibility of

witnesses is a trial court r·esponsibility.

The trial judge

specifically found Harris "quite a credible witness under
heated and extensive cross-examination"

(Tr.77).

The

testimony of the passerby who discovered Harris, of the
examining police of::icer, of the officers who saw appellant
and Harris at the bus station, of appellant's sister in
regards tc

appellan~'s

and the

tangib~e

details

o~

~it~

evidence at the scene all corroborate the

Bar~is'

ter~inology

intoxication of the morning after,

s testimony.

Harris's purported confusion

::a::..ls far short of rendering his testimony

"co:nplete::..y un8elie··able," as rec:;uired by this Court in

[I:t is settled that [the victim's
uncorroborated testimony] must be so
improbable that it is completely unbelievable
before it is insufficient to uphold a conviction.
597 P.2d at 911 (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly excluded from evidence a

-27-
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police report on the basis that it was hearsay and did not
qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule.
error was committed, it was harmless error

If, arguendo,

~hich

did not

affect appellant's substantive rights.
A victim's uncorroborated testimony is sufficient
to convict in a sexual abuse case, particularly where, as
here, circumstances and other testimony support the victim's
account.

The trial court, as the exclusive judge of the

credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the
evidence, determined in this case that adequate evidence
was present to sustain a verdict of guilt; and on review,
the evidence meets the standard of being adequately conclusiw
and probable so that reasonable minds could and did reasonably
believe that appellant committed the crime.
On the basis of the above authority and the evidence
against appellant presented at trial, respondent prays that
the verdict and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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